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As a prerequisite of an appropriate anti-terror strategy, it is indispensable to assess the 
underlying causes of terror. We examine social and economic conditions in the country of 
origin of terrorist attacks, claiming that low opportunity costs of terror, e.g., approximated by 
slow growth and poor institutions raise the likelihood of terror and the willingness in the 
population to support terror. Using a negative binomial regression model, we are able to show 
that unfortunate socio-economic conditions in a country are likely to reduce the opportunity 
costs of potential terrorists and increase the number of terrorist attacks originating from a 
specific country. Interestingly, this effect is particularly relevant after a certain level of 
development has been reached. We therefore distinguish between several broad country 
groups, namely the OECD, Europe and Islamic countries. 
JEL classification: P16, F15, C25  
Keywords: terror attacks, openness, discrete choice analysis, institutions 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The prevailing strategy to fight terrorism, or, more dramatic, to win the war on terrorism is to 
isolate the terrorists and their supporters, so as to minimize the (substantial) costs of 
terrorism.
1 This strategy is successful in that it helps reducing immediate terror threats. 
However, it also has cost in fiscal terms as well as with respect to declining civil liberties 
(The Economist 2008). In the economic literature this policy approach is implicitly backed by 
a number of empirical analyses (e.g., Abadie 2006; Krueger and Laitin 2008; Krueger and 
Malecková 2003; Kurrild-Klitgaard, Justensen and Klemmensen 2006; Krueger 2008) which 
show that terrorism is not rooted in poor socio-economic conditions (e.g., low levels of 
educational attainment, low income); rather, these studies claim that terrorists are typically 
well-educated and have a good economic status. The authors of these studies argue that 
terrorism is a political creature, i.e., that it is rooted in political repression. We argue that this 
view is overly simplistic as it misses some decisive aspects of terror and its foundations. In 
particular, it seems necessary to consider the environment of terrorist and their socio-
economic (and political) circumstances. In order to develop their strategies, terrorists need 
retreats and backing in the population. This backing may depend on a set of variables 
documenting these very socio-economic aspects. Given the widespread socio-economic 
underdevelopment of many Middle Eastern and other countries from which terror originates, 
hawkish counterterrorist strategies may backfire if they worsen socio-economic conditions 
further. For the development of sustainable anti-terror strategies, a deeper knowledge of the 
origins and causes of terrorism is required. In this study, we want to contribute some 
theoretical and empirical results that may be part of such a foundation. 
Our contribution contains a systematic analysis of the origins of terrorism by offering a 
theoretical analysis of the socio-economic background of terrorists, where we show how this 
background may translate into violence. Subsequently, we investigate some of our model’s 
implications empirically. Here, we put a special emphasis on the socio-economic and 
institutional situation in those countries from which terrorists originate. The focus is laid upon 
active terrorists and their background rather than on leaders of terrorist groups, as the latter 
                                                           
1 Terrorism may damage economic activity, e.g., by reducing trade (Nitsch and Schmacher 2004), FDI flows 
(Enders and Sandler 1996; Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003) and economic activity in certain industries, e.g., the 
tourism sector (Enders, Sandler and Parise 1992). Such negative effects may feed through to a reduction of 
overall economic growth (Crain and Crain 2006; Gaibulloev and Sandler 2008). It may also produce political 
costs, e.g., by affecting government stability (Gassebner, Jong-A-Pin and Mierau 2008) or voter behavior 
(Berrebi and Klor 2008).    Origins  of  Terrorism 
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regularly use terror as a means to meet other objectives. The main hypothesis is that terror is 
more easily generated in those parts of the world where poor socio-economic conditions and 
institutions prevail. While an empirical analysis of the determinants of the genesis of 
terrorism is associated with methodological problems (e.g., finding reliable data, cautious 
interpretation of the data etc.), we nevertheless think that it is worthwhile to conduct this 
study, given the enormous importance to learn about the motivation of terrorists and their 
environment against the background of the need for effective and efficient anti-terror 
strategies. As our main results, we challenge the widespread believe that poverty and poor 
socio-economic conditions are not determinants of terror. Opportunity costs of all 
stakeholders do not only depend on political variables. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. After a theoretical analysis of the 
behavior of terrorists and their environment in Section 3, we provide empirical evidence on 
the driving forces of terrorism in Sections 4 (method and data), 5 (results) and 6 (discussion). 
For our empirical estimates, we use a set of negative binomial regression models to take into 
account the special nature of our dependent variable. These core parts of the paper are 
surrounded by the following Section 2 which is dedicated to an overview about the related 
literature and the conclusions in Section 7.  
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A common definition characterizes terrorism as the “premeditated use, or threat of use, of 
extreme violence to obtain a political objective through intimidation or fear directed at a large 
audience.” (Tavares 2004, p. 1041). An economic analysis of terrorism (as the one we will 
provide in Section 3) assumes that terrorists are rational individuals (Caplan 2006). That is, 
the costs, benefits and opportunity cost of terrorism determine the level of terrorist activity 
carried out by individuals.
2 Costs from terror result, e.g., from the exhaustion of resources or 
the possibility of punishment by the government. Benefits from terror arise when terrorists are 
                                                           
2 One may argue that conducting terrorism (e.g., killing other people arbitrarily to meet certain objectives) also 
requires strong emotions. Wintrobe (2003) develops a model where individual terrorists choose between two 
(emotional) goods, namely intellectual independence and group solidarity. The potential terrorist trades 
independence against solidarity – and identity, as Harrison (2006) stresses – and strong leadership. Wintrobe’s 
model shows that terrorist activity may depend on individual desires and emotions, where the demand for 
solidarity again makes terrorism (including suicide terrorism) rational. That is, this theoretical approach also 
implicitly argues with the opportunity costs of terrorism.    Origins  of  Terrorism 
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successful in approaching their short-run or long-run goals, where the short-run goals are a 
destabilization of attacked economies and polities as well as publicity (e.g., Tavares 2004) 
and the long-run goal is a redistribution of power and wealth not enforceable in the ordinary 
political process (Frey and Luechinger 2003). Ultimately, terror is chosen as a tool to reach 
abstract political objectives as long as terrorists’ marginal benefits exceed marginal costs 
(Frey and Luechinger 2003; Harrison 2006). Following this economic perspective on the 
generation of terrorism, the theoretical and empirical literature has focused on those (country-
specific) factors influencing the costs, benefits and opportunity cost of terrorism, i.e., on the 
determinants of terrorism. Clearly, these factors matter to the terrorists. Also, they matter to 
the terrorists’ environment, i.e., to their families and supporters.
3 
From a theoretical point of view, earlier studies have argued that poor (country-specific) 
socio-economic conditions (e.g., poverty, slow growth, poor investment, trade disadvantages) 
is reflected in the cost-benefit considerations of terrorists and their environments, 
consequently providing incentives for violence. For instance, Gurr (1970) argues economic 
disparity makes it more likely that individuals feel economically disadvantaged and resort to 
violence to enforce economic change, so that that poverty morphs into violence. Similarly, 
slow growth may feed into violent behavior because there are relatively fewer prospects of 
economic advancement and participation (e.g., employment) in poor economic times 
(Blomberg, Hess and Weerapana 2004). Also, economic integration may curtail economic 
opportunities of globalization ‘losers’ and trigger grievances against the existing economic 
order, thus potentially increasing the risk of terror (Harrison 2006). Generally, poor socio-
economic conditions may translate into terrorism by making violence more beneficial as the 
pay-offs from terrorist success are comparatively high (e.g., a redistribution of wealth in favor 
of the terrorists). Also, poor socio-economic conditions may make violence more likely 
because its direct costs (e.g., from recruiting) and opportunity costs are comparatively low. 
For instance, terrorist organizations may capitalize on a comparatively large pool of recruits 
and supporters when poverty abounds, growth is poor or economic integration is perceived as 
‘unfair’. From a theoretical point of view, it is thus possible that poor socio-economic 
                                                           
3 Harrison (2006) argues that the terrorists’ environment also takes into account the (opportunity) costs and 
benefits of violence. For instance, terrorist supporters weigh off the identity created by terrorism against the 
benefits from non-support, basing their actual decision on the opportunity costs of terror. As another example, 
parents may support the decision of their children to become (suicide) terrorists, if the children’s future is 
unpromising (e.g., as unemployment is high) and if (as an alternative to non-violence) the children’s actions as a 
terrorist guarantee a martyr status in the society or financial support from terrorist organizations.    Origins  of  Terrorism 
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conditions result into terrorism by swaying the cost-benefit considerations of (potential) 
terrorists and their environment in ways that make violence more likely. 
Empirically, answering the question whether socio-economic factors indeed matter to the 
genesis of terrorism means to analyze the circumstances from which terrorists originate, 
regardless of their eventual targets.
4 Several studies provide support for the notion that 
terrorism is (partly) rooted in poor socio-economic conditions. In Lai (2007) and Blomberg 
and Hess (2008), high levels of income and low levels of income inequality are associated 
with lower levels of terrorism production. Burgoon (2006) finds that welfare policies 
(government activities) reduce the generation of terrorism by their leveling effect on 
unfavorable socio-economic conditions. That is, as social policies lower poverty and 
inequality in a society they make terrorism a less attractive option. Basuchoudhary and 
Shughart (2010) detect a negative link between the quality of economic institutions and the 
generation of terrorism. When the quality of economic institutions is poor (e.g., when 
property rights are not well protected), terrorism becomes more likely, suggesting a trade-off 
between institutional opportunities and terrorist violence. While institutional quality is often 
named as a source of economic success (e.g., Heckelman and Stroup 2000; Gwartney, 
Holcombe and Lawson 2006), the findings of Basuchoudhary and Shughart (2010) may thus 
suggest that poor institutional quality feeds through to terrorism by its adverse effects on 
economic performance and development. Finally, Blomberg and Hess (2008) and Kurrild-
Klitgaard, Justensen and Klemmensen (2006) find a negative correlation between trade 
openness and terrorism production. This indicates that economic integration is not recognized 
as a threat (Wintrobe 2006). Rather, it seems to be seen as an opportunity for economic gains, 
so that economic integration indirectly reduces the propensity for violence by fostering 
economic development (e.g., through trade gains). 
As already stressed in the introduction, the notion that terrorism is caused by poor socio-
economic conditions has been challenged by some scholars on theoretical and empirical 
                                                           
4 The empirical literature on terrorism determinants has mainly analyzed the origins and targets of transnational 
terrorism, recognizing the dyadic nature of this kind of terrorism. Transnational terrorism is terrorism involving 
citizens, groups or the territory of more than one country. In this study we focus on the source countries of 
terrorism, so we also center this review on this issue. Investigating the targets of terrorism means to scrutinize 
the traits of countries targeted by terror, irrespective of the country of origin of the terrorists. Studies taking the 
target perspective are, e.g., Blomberg, Hess and Weerapana (2004), Tavares (2004) and Krueger and Laitin 
(2008). These studies suggest that economically successful countries are more often targeted by terrorism than 
poor economies. See Krieger and Meierrieks (2010) for an overview of the literature.    Origins  of  Terrorism 
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grounds. Theoretically, some authors have stressed the role of the political and institutional 
order (e.g., Ross 1993) or of identity conflicts (e.g., Huntington 1996) in influencing terrorist 
activity. Empirically, some studies find political and institutional factors (e.g., Krueger and 
Malečková 2003; Kurrild-Klitgaard, Justensen and Klemmensen 2006), political instability 
(Piazza 2008) and ethnic tensions (Basuchoudhary and Shughart 2010) also matter to 
terrorism, potentially even trumping economic factors.
5 
The result of this literature review is thus that terrorism can be analyzed economically, 
assuming that terrorists and their support are influenced by the costs, benefits and opportunity 
costs of their behavior. Theoretically, socio-economic factors may influence this calculus, 
where poor socio-economic conditions are generally expected to foster terrorist activity. 
Empirically, it is by now unclear whether this transmission effect is indeed valid, or whether 
other mechanisms are more important. With this contribution, we want to provide a 
theoretical channel from poor socio-economic conditions (via the opportunity costs of 
violence) to terrorism and an empirical investigation of the implications of our model. If we 
indeed find that an improvement in the (country-specific) socio-economic environment makes 
terrorism less likely, this should have some important policy implications. Given that 
terrorism may be fought by hard or soft measures, i.e., by the use of ‘the stick’ or ‘the carrot’ 
(Frey 2004), corresponding results would suggest that an increase in the opportunity costs of 
terrorism (e.g., by means of economic success) feeds through to less terrorism, indicating that 
using the carrot is a valid option in the war on terror. 
 
III. THEORETICAL MOTIVATION: OPPORTUNITY COSTS OF TERROR 
If terrorism is rational, it seems to be intuitive to model it as one of several choices driven by 
economic constraints. The concept of opportunity costs is suitable for the theoretical analysis 
of the origin of terrorism, as it indicates what terrorists need to sacrifice when choosing to use 
violence. The opportunity costs are driven by different socio-economic and political 
circumstances and actors. We distinguish between different actors influencing the decision to 
commit terrorist attacks. Several groups are relevant. The first is the top-level of the terrorist 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 (2008). These studies suggest that economically successful countries are more often targeted by terrorism than 
poor economies. See Krieger and Meierrieks (2010) for an overview of the literature. 
5 See Krieger and Meierrieks (2010) for an overview on the theoretical and empirical literature on the 
determinants of terrorism.    Origins  of  Terrorism 
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organization. Their members can be characterized by a goal, which they want to meet, thereby 
using different instruments. One instrument is extremism, in our case terrorism. It is a means 
not an end. The decision to use a certain instrument itself is driven by rational calculus 
(Wintrobe 2006). Following to this reasoning, the top-level terrorists use an incentive 
structure to attract active terrorists.  
The incentives of these recruited persons – and their environment – are different in 
comparison to the ones of their leaders. Thus, the second relevant group is the environment of 
the terrorists, e.g. friends, parents or a sympathetic public. The more support the terrorists get 
from the environment the lower are the opportunity costs of terrorism for individuals. The 
third group are the terrorists themselves, whose characteristics and motivations have been 
extensively been discussed in the literature (see Section 2). The predisposition of an 
individual to become or support a terrorist is assumed to depend on the opportunity costs of 
terror. The fourth group that influences the opportunity costs of terrorism contains the local, 
domestic and foreign governments, trying to combat terrorism. They want to prevent 
individuals to become terrorists. Needless to say, that their influence is dependent on the 
local, intellectual and mental distance to the second and third group. 
Before we discuss the drivers of opportunity cost of terrorism, we first consider the terrorists’ 
deliberations leading to the idea of opportunity costs. The terrorist leaders try to attract 
terrorists by the help of the trade-off between two goods. In particular, Wintrobe’s (2003) idea 
of analyzing the trade-off between independence and solidarity is convincing. Solidarity 
includes the support of the environment. Within this framework, the opportunity costs of 
terrorism can be illustrated quite easily. The two goods we consider are individual wealth on 
earth and mental rewards for the terrorist. Mental rewards can include the promise of a happy 
life after death, the status and honor of a martyr, support for the family of a suicide bomber or 
even the restoration of individual forgone honor.
6 The terrorist is assumed to perceive life on 
earth as less desirable than the mental rewards, support and group solidarity, even including 
the promise to move into paradise after a successful suicide strike. 
                                                           
6 It is reported that groups force group members to suicide bombing by, e.g., threatening to do harm to the 
members’ relatives. This mechanism seems to function with young women who have been subject to sexual 
harassment in Islamic countries. To restore their self-appreciation, suicide bombing seems to be the last option 
(Harrison 2006).    Origins  of  Terrorism 
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We distinguish between two choices, namely the decision to support and/or become a terrorist 
or not, i.e., to consume mental rewards or to consume goods and services on earth. Analogous 
to the analysis of income and substitution effects in microeconomics, this decision can be 
analyzed in terms of the different utilities derived from either living in peace – and making a 
living on earth – or engaging in and/or supporting activities that lead to a terror assault, 
thereby qualifying for mental rewards. In Figure 1, consider an original budget constraint, 
represented by the line DE, together with indifference curves. The individual’s utility is 
maximized in A.  
Figure 1 
Choice between the Consumption of Goods and Mental Rewards 
 
 
If life on earth becomes more attractive, e.g., as per capita GDP increases with more 
economic opportunities, then the budget constraint moves to DF. In the case of given 
preferences, utility is maximized now in C. The move to B shows the income effect. This 
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move from B to C showing the substitution effect of the change in the budget restriction. The 
relative price of material wealth decreases in comparison to mental rewards increases and the 
individual prefers more consumption and fewer activities related to terror. Thus, the 
opportunity costs of terrorist activities have increased. If, however, the opportunity costs 
decrease by a sufficiently large degree, e.g., because there is an economic downturn, the 
budget constraint moves to DG, and terror becomes increasingly attractive. In an extreme 
case, a corner solution is reached and utility is maximized in D. As D is located both on the 
new (DG) and on the original budget constraint (DE), the only relevant effect here is the 
substitution effect. This corner solution may be interpreted as the choice of an individual to 
commit a suicide attack. 
Now we consider the drivers of opportunity costs. As already stressed by our literature review 
in Section 2, a core group of factors driving the opportunity costs of terrorism are 
macroeconomic conditions. From the review and the theory outlined before, we state several 
hypotheses that link socio-economic conditions to the emergence of terrorism. Among such 
socio-economic variables, openness to foreign trade is assumed to have positive effect on the 
propensity to terror (Wintrobe 2006). With high trade, the threats from trade for some 
individuals become obvious; trade then may be positively related to terror. A second 
influential variable is income. We expect an ambiguous effect: In rich countries, GDP per 
capita or its growth may be positively correlated with terrorism, since as an empirical 
phenomenon in rich countries an increasing number of young people may become unsatisfied 
with the economic and political system. In poor countries, we would rather expect increasing 
opportunity costs – and less terror – with higher GDP per capita and likewise with GDP 
growth. Another proxy for opportunity costs is investment: the higher investment, the better 
future prospects and the lower the willingness of individuals to become terrorists. Finally, a 
high share of government consumption in GDP can be interpreted in two ways: on the one 
hand it can be expressed as a proxy for misallocation, as the government demands a huge 
share of income for consumption purposes. Thus, it reduces opportunity costs of terror. On 
the other hand, it can be an input – education, health, infrastructure, social welfare policies 
(e.g., Burgoon 2006) – for economic improvement and therefore increase opportunity costs. 
We follow the second interpretation. Higher education (human capital) should also increase 
opportunity costs of terror. However, it has been argued in the literature that higher levels of    Origins  of  Terrorism 
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are sometimes positively linked to terrorism production (e.g., Krueger and Malečková 2003). 
Our hypotheses are thus: 
•  Hypothesis 1: Globalization is perceived as a threat. The higher trade relative to GDP, the 
higher is the probability of terrorist activities originating from this country. 
•  Hypothesis 2: In rich countries, high GDP spurs terrorist activities; in poor countries, high 
GDP deters terrorist activities. 
•  Hypothesis 3: Higher public spending increases the opportunity costs of terrorism. 
•  Hypothesis 4: A higher degree of education diminishes terrorism. 
In the following empirical analysis, we test these core hypotheses. Given that terrorism may 
also be rooted in non-economic conditions (Krieger and Meierrieks 2010), we include several 
control variables which have a rather indirect link to the concept of opportunity costs. First, 
we control for properties of the citizens, namely the size of population.
7 Some other variables 
can also give information on the opportunity costs of terror resulting from country-specific 
effects. The opportunity costs are higher the higher the institutional quality in a country is, 
e.g., measured by the Fraser Index for Economic Freedom (Gwartney et al. 2007). One would 
expect that this relation is stronger in countries with less economic freedom than in countries 
with more economic freedom, as smaller differences on a high level are less relevant. In 
addition, the number of patents granted in the US originating from a country is expected to be 
negatively related to terrorism, as this number shows the technological strength of the 
country. The higher the number of patents is, the higher are the opportunity the costs of terror. 
However, it again can be interpreted differently for different country groups. If there is no 
technological base, this variable may be less relevant than for countries with a broader base. 
Finally, the number of past terror attacks is included.  
We argue that we can apply the theoretical thoughts both to the active terrorist and to his 
environment. Although the latter does not commit the terrorist acts, the propensity of 
individuals to be sympathetic to terrorists is a function of the opportunity costs. The better the 
socio-economic conditions today and prospects for the future, the less sympathy these 
                                                           
7 It would be superior to use the share of young persons – under 15 years of age –adding to potential violence 
(e.g., Krieger and Meierrieks 2010). However, data are not available over a longer time span.    Origins  of  Terrorism 
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individuals have for terrorists – they simply have more to lose.
8 In other words, an outward 
shift of the budget constraint in Figure 1 reduces the public support for terror and thereby 
indirectly the level of actual terrorist activities. Therefore, the basic hypothesis is that terror is 
rooted in countries in which the opportunity costs of terrorism are low. Thus, it is not the 
individual terrorist whose characteristics are important as the individual often may be 
mentally ill and disguised. Rather, the atmosphere of the environment of terrorists and their 
background matter. 
 
IV. METHOD AND DATA  
Unfortunately, the individual decision to become a terrorist and its dependence on socio-
economic characteristics in the country of origin of terrorism are not observable to us. What 
we can observe, however, are country aggregates with respect to terrorist activities. This 
implies that our dependent variable is a count variable (non-negative integers), namely the 
numbers of attacks by individuals originating from a certain country during a given time 
span.
9 Specifically, for our analysis we use an estimation model for which we can use panel 
data to explain the number of terrorist attacks by a set of country characteristics (e.g., trade 
openness, GDP, population size) intended to approximate opportunity costs. This requires the 
application of regression methods specifically designed to cope with count data. In particular, 
the overdispersion phenomenon leads to the application of a panel regression model for count 
data (in our case, the number of terror incidents) which is based on the negative binomial 
distribution. In contrast to the Poisson distribution where the mean is restricted to equal the 
variance, the negative binomial distribution is able to account for a variance that is larger than 
the mean (overdispersion). Specifically, we apply the negative binomial regression with fixed 
effects as proposed by Hausman et al. (1984) and implemented in Stata. See also Cameron 
and Trivedi (1998) for a more detailed account of count data regression. 
                                                           
8 One may argue that the declining violence in Northern Ireland or in the Basque country is supporting this line 
of reasoning. Similarly, the declining success of the RAF in Germany follows this pattern.  
9 We do not distinguish between attacks with and without casualties as well as not take the number of victims 
into account, as this is often a matter of (bad) “luck” for the terrorist or the victims respectively. Further, the 
country of origin of the terrorist is the home country of that organization claiming responsibility or proven as 
responsible.     Origins  of  Terrorism 
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Letting ...} , 2 , 1 , 0 { ∈ it y  denote the number of terror incidents in country  } ..., , 1 { N i∈  at time 
} ..., , 1 { i T t ∈ , indicating the five-year periods we use. Thus we are in the situation of an 
unbalanced panel. This variable acts as our dependent variable in all subsequent regressions 
and evidently is a non-negative integer magnitude. The expected number of terror incidents 
depends on a vector of explanatory variables  it x  and a country specific fixed effect  i α , i.e. 
) exp( ) | ( β x x it i it it α y E ′ + =  with β as the vector of regression parameters to be estimated. This 
expected value is assumed to be associated with the negative binomial distribution. 
 
The data for the number of terror assaults during 1971 to 2005 originating from a country are 
from the Terrorist Knowledge Base of the MIPT (2006), a US governmental funded think 
tank. From these data a variable Yit is constructed, representing the number of terror incidents 
originating from a country i during a five year span t (1971-1975, …, 2001-2005). We have 
five different samples: all countries available, OECD countries (OECD), European countries 
(Europe), Islamic countries (Islam), and Islamic countries excluding oil producers (Islam2).
10 
Note that while past empirical studies have mostly focused on transnational terrorism, we 
focus on all terrorist activity originating from a country, so that we also take into account 
‘purely’ domestic terrorism.
 11 While a focus on transnational terrorism only may lead to 
biased results (Sanchez-Cuenca and Calle 2009), our definition of the dependent variable 
circumvents such problems and gives a broader look on the phenomenon of terrorism. 
The data for the explanatory variables are assembled from various data sets that are frequently 
used in the literature on cross-country growth regressions. These consist of updates of the 
Penn World Table (PWT 6.1), with an earlier version being described in Summers and Heston 
(1991) and various other sources.
12 In particular, the explanatory variables used in the 
regressions are: 
•  Openness to international trade from the PWT 6.1 (exports plus imports divided by GDP, 
constant prices, in percent); 
•  Material wealth in the economy, quantified by the variable real GDP per capita from the 
PWT 6.1 (real GDP per capita, constant prices, chain index); 
                                                           
10 An overview of the different country samples is given in the appendix.    Origins  of  Terrorism 
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•  Alternatively, the growth rate of real GDP per capita (PWT 6.1); 
•  Capital accumulation in the economy from the PWT 6.1 (investment share of GDP, 
constant prices, in percent); 
•  Consumptive governmental expenditures in the economy, quantified by the variable 
government ratio, from the PWT 6.1 (government share of GDP, constant prices, in 
percent); 
•  Human capital, measured by the average schooling years in the total population older than 
15 years, taken from an updated version of the data set of Barro and Lee (1993, 1996); 
•  Population size, quantified by the variable POP from the PWT 6.1 (population in 1000); 
•  Patents, denoted as the number of patents granted in the USA during 1980 to 1990 using 
data from the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). The number of patents is 
transformed by the natural logarithm to limit the differences between countries with a 
relatively low number of patents and countries with a relatively high number of patents. 
The case of countries with a zero number of patents is allowed for by the addition of unity; 
•  The quality of institutions in a country, quantified by the Index of Economic Freedom from 
Fraser Institute (Gwartney et al. 2007). 
 
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Using the data as described above, we run several specifications of our regression model in 
order to assess the influence of socio-economic conditions on the emergence of terrorism. 
First, we run a baseline model specification using only those variables closely linked to a 
country’s socio-economic environment and thus terrorism’s opportunity costs. The results are 
reported in Table 1. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
11 Although domestic terrorism is a more common phenomenon (e.g., Abadie 2006), past analyses have focused 
on the determining factors of transnational terrorism due to data constraints.  
12 Table 4 in the appendix shows the descriptive statistics.    Origins  of  Terrorism 
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Table 1 clearly shows that we have for the full sample and the European countries the most 
statistically significant coefficients.
13 In the full sample, trade openness, the size of 
government and the population are statistically significant and have the expected signs. In the 
sample for Europe we have a statistically significant influence of real GDP per capita, of the 
size of government (negative as expected) and of the population (negative as expected). 
Population size in all specification has a statistically significant negative influence.
14 We find 




Baseline Specification with Core Explanatory Variables 
(Negative Binomial Estimates with Fixed Effects) 
 



















































likelihood-ratio  index  0.157 0.056 0.081 0.237 0.232 
number  of  countries  123  28 18 28 21 
total  sample  size  891 218 142 181 137 
Note: dependent variable is the number of terror incidents within a five-year interval; absolute t-statistics are 
given in parentheses below the coefficient estimates; goodness-of-fit is measured by the likelihood ratio index 
(Mc-Fadden's-R
2); significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
 
Next, we amend the baseline model with a quadratic effect of the GDP to investigate whether 
terrorism and per capita GDP are related in a nonlinear way. The results are reported in Table 
2. If we extend our baseline specification by a quadratic effect of the GDP, we clearly detect a 
U-shaped pattern of the effect of real GDP per capita on terror for the full sample, for the 
Islamic countries (weakly significant) and the Islamic countries when excluding the Gulf 
                                                           
13 Diagnostics for multicollinearity (e.g. the condition number and variance inflation factors) indicate that 
multicollinearity may be a problem for the lacking significance in the regressions. 
14 This result is surprising as the literature rather predicts a positive relationship. The difference might be 
explained by methodical differences; we use a panel, whereas most of the literature refers to cross-country 
studies. We also concentrate on the origins of terror and not the targets: bigger countries may attract relatively 
more attacks. There may also be a bias in data collecting towards bigger countries.    Origins  of  Terrorism 
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States. Only for the OECD countries we do not find this U-shaped effect, however for the 
European countries we have an inverse U-shaped effect of the GDP per capita on terror for 
the European countries. This indicates that we have a rather heterogeneous sample. Generally, 
a strengthening of the significance of several effects occurs, but also losses of significance can 




Baseline Specification Extended by a Quadratic Effect of GDP 
(Negative Binomial Estimates with Fixed Effects) 
 































































likelihood-ratio  index  0.162 0.056 0.101 0.241 0.250 
number  of  countries  123  28 18 28 21 
total  sample  size  891 218 142 181 137 
Note: dependent variable is the number of terror incidents within a five-year interval; absolute t-statistics are 
given in parentheses below the coefficient estimates; goodness-of-fit is measured by the likelihood ratio index 
(Mc-Fadden's-R
2); significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
 
Table 3 reports the results of a substantial augmentation of the regression specification by 
adding several explanatory variables (labeled extended specification). First, considering the 
additional variables for economic freedom and patents, we clearly find that they have a 
statistically significant influence in none of the regressions. If we consider the independent 
factor human capital it has a statistically significant influence in the OECD countries and in 
European countries, both positive and statistically significant. The investment ratio has a 
negative statistically significance in the full sample but in none of the sub-samples. To 
summarize the findings, these additional valuables contribute something to the over all 
explanation but especially the Fraser index and the patents have no statistically significant 
influence. The loss of significance in the case of the variables included in the extended    Origins  of  Terrorism 
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regressions can be explained by multicollinearity which is naturally more pronounced in this 
extended set of variables. 
 
Table 3 
Extended Specification  
(Negative Binomial Estimates with Fixed Effects) 
 





































































































likelihood-ratio  index  0.450 0.240 0.273 0.622 0.576 
number  of  countries  94 26 16 16 13 
total sample size  573  177  112  96  79 
Note: dependent variable is the number of terror incidents within a five-year interval; absolute t-statistics are 
given in parentheses below the coefficient estimates; goodness-of-fit is measured by the likelihood ratio index 
(Mc-Fadden's-R
2); significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
 
VI. DISCUSSION AND INTERPRETATION 
After having a first look at the results, we now want to discuss the findings in more detail and 
with respect to our hypothesis that the opportunity costs (reflected in socio-economic 
conditions) sway terrorist activity markedly. As the Tables 1 to 3 show, the results are 
somewhat mixed, but in general give support to our hypothesis, namely that opportunity costs    Origins  of  Terrorism 
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of terror drive the number of attacks originating from a country, where this number positively 
depends on macroeconomic performance and negatively depends on population. 
Considering trade openness as a proxy for the degree of globalization, for the full sample we 
find that openness has a positive impact on terror, which implies that in general it is seen as a 
threat. Considered from the perspective of different country groups, the effect of globalization 
is as suggested by theory. In rich countries, the threat seems to be bigger than in poorer 
countries. That is, our findings to some extend confirm earlier results by Wintrobe (2006) and 
somewhat contradict Blomberg and Hess (2008) and Kurrild-Klitgaard, Justensen and 
Klemmensen (2006) who detect a negative correlation between trade openness and terrorism 
production. 
Next, the impact of GDP per capita on terror is significantly positive – except for the Islamic 
world where it is not significant. When we additionally consider a nonlinear effect of this 
variable as in the second specification, the impact of the quadratic term is significantly 
positive in the full sample and in the Islamic countries, but negative in Europe. Therefore, the 
results are only partly contradicting our theoretical reasoning. Similar results pointing at 
negative effects of higher income on terrorism production are found, e.g., in Lai (2007) and 
Blomberg and Hess (2008). However, for the Islamic world our findings are not in line with 
Piazza (2007) who does not find that economic development is significantly associated with 
terrorism. Interestingly, Lai (2007) also documents a positive effect of income on terrorism 
production in the simple specification, while finding a negative one when using a quadratic 
specification. He argues that a quadratic term more fittingly displays the production of 
terrorism in countries that are in intermediate development positions. In such countries, the 
terror opportunity costs may generally favor its generation. On the one hand, income is not 
high enough to discourage terror; on the other hand, poor institutions and few available policy 
resources in such countries may be incapable of solving social conflict. This idea matches our 
findings of a threshold effect of development. 
Investment is negatively correlated with terror for the whole sample (only here statistically 
significant) as well as in OECD countries, including Europe, but positively in the Islamic 
world. Again, one can argue that a certain level of investment is necessary to increase the 
opportunity costs of terror.    Origins  of  Terrorism 
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Government expenditures show a significantly negative impact for the whole sample OECD 
and European countries. It is insignificantly so for the Islamic world. In rich countries, 
government expenditures may serve to protect from all sorts of risk, including the threats of 
globalization. This corresponds with the findings of Burgoon (2006) on the terror-dampening 
effect of social welfare policies, as related spending makes up a large part of government 
expenditure. In Islamic countries, the role of government spending seems to be less 
pronounced, perhaps because welfare states are less developed in this country group. In sum, 
governmental expenditures seem to discourage terror only in some world regions. 
Human capital encourages terror production significantly in OECD and European countries. 
Its influence is not clear in the whole sample and insignificantly positive in the Islamic world. 
Again, the likelihood of education to deter terror is dependent on the educational level. For 
education, our findings contradict the ones of Krueger and Malečková (2003) and Kurrild-
Klitgaard, Justensen and Klemmensen (2006) who do not attribute a strong role to education 
in reducing the generation of terror. From our findings, human capital encourages terrorism in 
the OECD and European countries. Testas (2004) finds that Islamic countries with more 
educated populations are also likelier targets of terrorism, indicating that an identity between 
the impact of education on the targets and sources of terrorism exists for these countries.  
Our findings on population size fit with the general consensus that demographic stress is 
linked to increases in terror (e.g. Burgoon 2006; Lai 2007). We cannot state a relationship 
between the age structure and terror inclination for a lack of data, but may hypothesize that 
large but aging population has a significantly reducing impact on the opportunity costs of 
terror. 
A high degree of economic freedom should deter terror in free countries but the influence is 
not significant. This may indicate a trade-off between institutional opportunities and political 
violence, as detected by Basuchoudhary and Shughart (2010). The poor institutional 
environment of these countries (e.g., Kuran 2004) may have deprived individuals of economic 
opportunities, resulting in rather low opportunity costs of terror. For instance, a disregard for 
property rights may have contributed to low levels of economic development in the region 
(Kuran 2004), where these institutional arrangements have been consistently found to be 
detrimental to economic growth. Thus, poor institutional quality may have fed through to 
terrorism through its negative effect on the socio-economic environment.    Origins  of  Terrorism 
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Patents should have a negative impact on terrorist activities. The interpretation may be that 
the number of patents granted in the United States is so low that an increasing number is 
rather making clear the technological gap and increases inclination to violence. However, this 
variable has no statistically significant impact. Evidently, there is no clear link from 
technological capacity to terrorism. 
Finally, the lag terror variable suggests path dependence. This path dependence matches with 
previous findings of temporal contagion effects of terror, e.g. as in Enders and Sandler (2005) 
or Lai (2007). For instance, longer terrorist campaigns should generate more media attention, 
thereby making such a strategy more attractive. Terrorist inclination apparently is a long-term 
phenomenon, which makes it even more necessary to analyze its causes.  
In addition to the specifications in Tables 1 through 3, we did a number of robustness tests. 
Upon excluding all observations lying in the five-year intervals 1971-1975, 1976-1980 and 
2001-2005 we find the pattern of coefficient signs staying largely robust, although some 
changes of significance are observed. Exclusion of three countries that are suspect to be 
extraordinarily affected by and involved in terrorism (Afghanistan, Iraq and Israel, where 
Israel gets assigned also the terror attacks originating from the Palestinians) and repeating the 
regression analysis did not change the results much either. We also tested when several 
outlying observations removed from the sample. The outliers are identified by applying 
several diagnostics that are constructed for the detection of outliers and influential 
observations in linear regression to a fixed effects regression. Diagnostics applied are dfbetas, 
dffits, covariance ratio, cook distance, and hat values which are described and discussed in 
Belsley et al. (1980) as well as Cook and Weisberg (1982). Indication of one of the 
diagnostics triggered the exclusion of an observation. In total 28 observations (five-year 
intervals of particular countries) have been identified as outlying and influential in this way. 
The results did not change fundamentally. Finally, the further inclusion of the interaction of 
the human capital variable with real GDP per capita is only weakly significant in one case and 
does not add much explanatory power to the regressions. 
    Origins  of  Terrorism 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
This contribution has offered a stylized theoretical reasoning as to why socio-economic 
conditions should matter to the likelihood of the emergence of terrorism in certain countries, 
contrary to what some empirical studies on the genesis of terrorism have suggested. Arguing 
with the opportunity costs of terrorism, we have been able to show these opportunity costs 
(reflected in country-specific socio-economic conditions) may influence the terrorists’ and 
terrorists’ supporters’ decisions. 
We then provided an empirical analysis to check the validity of our theoretical reasoning. 
Generally, the results of our econometric analysis offered some support. The proxies chosen 
to reflect the opportunity costs of terror were found to have an impact on terrorism. Despite 
some puzzling results such as a positive impact of GDP per capita, we found that terrorist 
activities are clearly associated with some socio-economic factors. One very important result 
is that there is a threshold of development with respect to macroeconomic performance. As 
long as this threshold is not surpassed, better performance rather encourages terror. After that, 
the usual interpretation of opportunity costs of terrorism holds; they matter, in particular with 
respect to the environment of potential terrorists.  
This evidence allows for modest policy conclusions deviating from rigid or violent 
counterterrorist strategies that rely on the “stick”, at least in the medium and long run. We 
generally argue in favor of using the “carrot”, i.e., in favor of measures influencing the 
opportunity costs of terror in ways that reduce violence, as proposed by Frey and Luechinger 
(2003) and Frey (2004). First and foremost, the results suggest that growth and better 
economic performance can help increasing the opportunity cost of terrorism. The sooner 
countries get rich the better are the prospects of a peaceful future. This result is also perfectly 
in line with what both trade theory and empirical evidence on trade suggest. Second, it may 
therefore be helpful to guide trade policy in the US and the EU towards the developing world 
under the given perspective. In addition (but not shown here), overcoming the institutional 
trap seems important also for both the economic success of a country and for the fight against 
terrorism. 
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 full  sample OECD  Europe  Islam  Islam2 
sample means:       
no.  of  terror  incidents  9.52 9.08  10.46 6.77 7.95 
lagged  terror  dummy  0.31 0.40 0.38 0.38 0.42 
openness  61.73 47.18 55.32 69.08 61.06 
real GDP per capita  8365.68  15518.78  16895.01  4913.00  2567.83 
investment  ratio  17.12 22.87 23.54 13.34 11.79 
government  ratio  20.08 17.57 18.35 23.37 22.71 
human  capital  5.72 8.22 7.88 3.39 3.13 
population  42897.63 34682.30 17986.15 38466.55 42746.85 
Fraser  index  5.67 6.42 6.53 5.07 4.90 
no. of patents  944.71  2986.86  638.62  0.96  0.88 
no.  of  countries  95 26 16 16 13 
sample variances:       
no.  of  terror  incidents  2682.13 507.85 575.17 362.29 433.52 






AFG, ALB, DZA, AGO, ARG, AUS, AUT, BHS, BHR, BGD, BRB, BEL, BLZ, BEN, BOL, 
BWA, BRA, BGR, BDI, KHM, CMR, CAN, CAF, TCD, CHL, CHN, COL, ZAR, COG, 
CRI, CIV, CYP, DNK, DJI, DOM, ECU, EGY, SLV, EST, FJI, FIN, FRA, GAB, GER, GEO, 
GHA, GRC, GTM, GNB, GUY, HTI, HND, HKG, HUN, ISL, IND, IDN, IRN, IRQ, IRL, 
ISR, ITA, JAM, JPN, JOR, KEN, KWT, LAO, LVA, LBN, LTU, LUX, MDG, MWI, MYS, 
MLI, MLT, MUS, MEX, MAR, BUR, NAM, NPL, NLD, NZL, NIC, NER, NGA, NOR, 
OMN, PAK, PAN, PNG, PRY, PER, PHL, POL, PRT, ROM, RUS, RWA, SAU, SEN, SLE, 
SGP, SOM, ZAF, KOR, ESP, LKA, SWE, CHE, SYR, TWN, TZA, THA, TGO, TTO, TUN, 
TUR, UGA, UKR, ARE, GBR, USA, URY, VEN, YEM, ZMB, ZWE 
 
OECD Sample (current member countries): 
AUS, AUT, BEL, CAN, DNK, FIN, FRA, GER, GRC, HUN, ISL, IRL, ITA, JPN, LUX, 
MEX, NLD, NZL, NOR, POL, PRT, KOR, ESP, SWE, CHE, TUR, GBR, USA 
 
Europe Sample (core European countries): 
AUT, BEL, DNK, FIN, FRA, GER, GRC, ISL, IRL, ITA, LUX, NLD, NOR, PRT, ESP, 
SWE, CHE, GBR 
 
Islam Sample (countries with dominating Islamic religion): 
AFG, ALB, DZA, BHR, BGD, TCD, DJI, EGY, IDN, IRN, IRQ, JOR, KWT, LBN, MLI, 
MAR, NER, OMN, PAK, SAU, SEN, SLE, SOM, SYR, TUN, TUR, ARE, YEM    Origins  of  Terrorism 
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Islam2 Sample (excluding mainly oil producing Gulf States): 
AFG, ALB, DZA, BGD, TCD, DJI, EGY, IDN, JOR, LBN, MLI, MAR, NER, PAK, SEN, 
SLE, SOM, SYR, TUN, TUR, YEM 
 
(number of observations not corresponding to the size of the country sample may be caused 
by missing data for some variables) 
 